

~~DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE~~
~~Security Committee~~

9 March 1981

25X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

~~Executive Secretary~~

SUBJECT: Release of SECOM "A Study of Harassments and Provocations" to DIA Cleared Contractor

25X1A 1. [redacted] CI Division, DIA, (telephone [redacted]) requested that permission to release a copy of the attached DCI Security Committee "A Study of Harassments and Provocations" file SECOM-D-342, dated July 1978, classified SECRET and marked NOFORN to the [redacted] be granted. ILLEGIB 25X1A

25X1 2. The [redacted] is a cleared contractor of the Defense Intelligence School and is under contract to the school to produce a textbook on foreign intelligence and security services. The contract will require the contractor to return all basic documents to the USG. 25X1


3. DIA has a similar document which is under a NO CONTRACT control caveat. Since the attached SECOM study parallels the DIA study, but does not have the NO CONTRACT control caveat, it would be an easier document to pass to the contractor.

4. A perusal of the SECOM study indicates that the cases in the study were compiled from input by members of the DCI Security Committee. While the case studies appear to have been sterilized in some cases the USG agency involved is clearly identifiable. More precise data on individual SECOM member input, however, is not available to permit a more detailed referral to the actual case contributor.

ILLEGIB

25X1A Propose that DIA member raise at next SeCom
This will permit contributors to make their comments.

raise this point at the next SeCom meeting. 9 March 81
EU 3/9/81 1300L

5. If the premise on which SECOM distributed the study was that its dissemination was at the SECRET collateral level to all appropriately cleared US citizen persons, but was not releasable to foreign nationals, it is recommended that permission be granted to release the study to the 

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


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Attachment

Secret

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A Study of Harassments and Provocations

Secret

SECOM-D-342

July 1978

Copy 1038

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FOREWORD

This study documents various types of harassments and provocations against U.S. military and civilian personnel traveling in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and other areas of the world. The cases in the study illustrate operational procedures used by hostile intelligence services. These cases were compiled from input by members of the DCI Security Committee.

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INTRODUCTION

The initial DCI Security Committee study on harassments and provocations was published in 1967 and updated in 1974. The following compilation of incidents and events which have occurred since 1974 is intended to aid member agencies in the preparation of defensive briefings.

The incidents and events cited in this study occurred mainly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The two incidents cited in Africa and the one in India were Soviet-related. No information on Chinese activities of this nature have been reported as of this update.

The definitions of harassment and provocation are given below:

HARASSMENT: Any action taken against a person or group to prevent or delay the achievement of objectives. The action may be of an inconsequential or annoying nature escalating to one of major proportions. The harassment may also be a prelude to a provocation.

PROVOCATION: Any action taken against a person, group, or intelligence service to induce self-damaging action. The provocation is frequently the prelude to a recruitment attempt or official action by the state, including arrest, imprisonment, or expulsion.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The cases in this study do not reveal any significant changes in types of harassments and provocations by hostile intelligence services against U.S. travelers. But, they do document the fact that efforts continue to exist. New techniques are not being used probably because techniques used in the past have continued to be effective. Common forms of harassment mentioned in the study include: close and obvious surveillance, travel delays, customs delays, obvious searches of luggage and personal belongings in hotel rooms, misplaced documents and personal effects, and occasional detentions and arrests. Provocation attempts include: sexual exploitation, drugging, inebriation, illegal currency exchanges on the black market, illegal icon sales, and requests to mail letters abroad.

All U.S. travelers, civilian or military, are likely candidates for possible recruitment by hostile intelligence services (basically the KGB and EEIS). These intelligence services devote specific attention to travelers who meet the following criteria:

- Speak the language.
- Have relatives in that country.
- Make repeated trips to that country.
- Have contacts with foreign officials.
- Work for the U.S. Government, particularly in positions involving foreign affairs, national security, and military affairs.

- Express strong views against capitalism.

Individuals meeting any of the above stated criteria should be especially circumspect in their behavior while traveling abroad. They may be the object of hostile intelligence services' harassment and provocation attempts to test their susceptibility to compromise or possible reactions.

Departments or agencies should continue to give defensive briefings to all government-affiliated personnel selected for long-term assignments and short-term visits (TDYs). The briefings should include tactics and procedures used in harassment and provocation attempts. The briefings should emphasize the importance of immediately reporting suspected attempts of this nature. It should also be emphasized that personal embarrassment or self-denigration must not prevent the reporting of incidents. Assurances should be given that all possible assistance will be given by U.S. authorities to help the individual(s) involved.

Continued data collection of harassments and provocations will enable the various departments and agencies to give explicit advice and guidance in future defensive briefings for their employees traveling abroad. And, upon returning from overseas trips or assignments, debriefings should be conducted. These debriefings would be beneficial in perfecting efforts to negate future harassment and provocation attempts by hostile intelligence services.

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